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The Psychology of Protective Behavior 
Abstract 
What determines whether people will.protect themselves against 
the severe losses that might arise from. some low-probability hazard? 
What factors underlie the perception and acceptability of technological 
risks? The answers J.t.o questions such as these are vital for under-
standing how people cope with threats from accidents, diseases, and 
natural hazards and for helping them manage theif lives more effecti'l.ely /,..,;,.·~.::- ,- ., 
in the face of such risks. This paper illustrates the role that;J:he ':. 
,·-·-----
psychological study of judgment and decision processes can play in providing 
answers to these questions. Recent experiments studying insurance dec.isions, 
risk perceptions, and the evaluation of technological risks are described 
along with the implications of this research for matters of public safety. 
'The Psychology of Protective Behavior1 
This paper presents al brief overview of recent research on the 
psychology of protective behavior. In particular,· this research is 
_________ c_o~~;_1!_.9ue~!1:~n~ _ Sl:l_<?!i:_ ~s: 
1. What determines whether people will protect themselves against 
the severe losses that might arise from some rare hazard? 
2. What factors underlie the perception arid acceptability of risks 
from technology.? 
The answers to questions such as these are vital for understanding 
how people cope with threats from accidents, diseases, and natural 
hazards and for helping them manage their lives more effectively in the 
face of such risks. The role that the studyu5f · judgment and decision 
processes can play in providing answers to these questions will be 
explored in this paper. Recent experiments studying insurance dec,isions, 
risk perception, and evaluation of technological risks will be described 
along with the implications of this research for matters of public safety. 
Insurance Decisions 
The first topic to be discussed deals with insurance behavior. In 
light of the tremendous importance of insurance as a protective mechanism, 
it is .remarkable how little research has been done on the psychology of 
insurance-purchasing decisions. The research described below was 
stimulated by the observation that it was difficult to induce residents of 
flood and earthquake areas to purchase insurance against those hazards, even when 
2 
90%~;of the premium was subsidized by the government (see Kunreuther, 
Ginsberg, Miller, Sagi, Slavic, BorRin, & Katz, 1978). As a result, we 
conducted a "series of. insurance ~xp_eriment.~, _'r~pJ~rted in· deta:i;l .in' 'S1civ~c, 
--------'-'-F~i_s_c_h~h_o_f f , .. Licht"ens t_ein ,--_ po'r':ri'g"an. & ' Ccimbs_ '(19 7_7.) ·. 
~--~--"----"--------'""'""'---------J 
One reason for lack of research on insurance decision making is that 
it is difficult to create a laboratory situation analogous to that faced 
in real-life settings. For example, while it is not difficult to create 
events with probabilities comparable to various natural hazards, simulating 
the loss of a home or business is another matter. Certainly, it is immoral 
for an experimenter to threaten a subject's. economic well-being, even in 
return for a substantial reward for engaging in risk; it also would be 
improper to exploit an existing risk· situation for the sake of scientific 
knowledge (e.g., willfully manipulating the policies offered to subjects 
living in hazard-prone areas). 
·~Tb C6lfnte.r _t:Jrese qTfliC:ulties ;· we·-~c:ieated an ela·o'ora't"e,-,- - · _ ' 
-~---- ,; __ ,.-.J.......__...-.~~---, ____ ..,.-~---'--.... ~---------- -------~--.. . -
farm-management simulation run by a computer. We brought people into 
our laboratory and had them play the role of a>.farmer who had many 
decisions to make each year-,-,.about crops, fertilizers, and also insurance. 
Our subjects were instructed as follows: 
Farming is a business that requires decisions. In this game, 
the number of decisions has been reduced considerably from the 
number that .. must be made on a real farm; however, the principles 
are the same. The decisions you will make at the beginning of each 
play year are: (1) what crops you are going to plant; (2) what 
and how much fertilizer you will purchase and apply to those crops; 
and (3) what insurance you will buy, if any, against certain natural 
hazards. 
r---- ------
"'- ------- -~--
-----·- ----...--·· 3 
...... __ .-------
' Participants played the game for 15 rounds, each round representing 
one year. Their income for each year was determined by t.he wisdom of 
their decisions, by random fluctuations in crop yield and market price, 
and by the randomly determined occurrences of the natural hazards. At 
the beginning of the game, each subject was given a 240-acre farm with 
a permanent concrete pipe irrigation system, a variety of farm equipment, 
and $80,000 of debt, leaving an initial net wor.th of about $200,000. 
The instructions, which took one to one and a half hours to··,complete, 
described the characteristics of the seven crops available (mean. yield 
per acre, standard deviation of yield, mean and standard deviation of 
market price); the efficacy of two types of fertilizer for each crop, 
the fixed costs of growing each crop (machinery, labor and water), and 
the risks they faced from natural hazards. For each of the 15 rounds, 
the subjects' decisions were entered·into a computer, which then prepared 
a year-end report. This report showed the subjects' previous financial 
situation, farm production v.esults (yield and market price), hazards 
incurred, yearly expenses, and a year-end list of assets and debts. In some 
versions of this game, subjects' earnings·:after 15 years of farming were 
converted to salary~ They were paid between $2.50 and $20 depending on 
their final net worth. 
Table 1 shows the natural hazards faced by the subjects. The 
hazards were left unnamed, to render irrelevant any.particular knowledge 
or beliefs subjects might have1·had about the probabilities or losses 
associated with real hazards such as hail or hurricanes. This decision 
afforded control over the perceived probability of each hazard. Note 
that as the probability of loss 'decreased, the amount of loss increased 
proportionately. Losses and premiums were established so that (a) the 
.__..,_, _____ -----··-.· 
---- . 
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largest loss equalled or exceeded the value of the farm, thus ending 
the game should the largest loss be incurred; and (b) ·the cost of the 
premium would be significant. The average subject's net profit was 
approximately $6,000 per year. Thus, the purchase of insurance, at 
$500 per hazard, was a significant expense. 
Insert Table 1 .. about here 
The results of the first year of farming, as shown by Figure 1, are 
typical of what we found in several different experiments, including some 
which used the farm simulation and others which used a different type of 
risk setting. They indicate that people were more likely to insure against 
h.Tglier'...:probao'{fl·ty,-' ·loW-:foi=fs. haiard·s-:ra tfier-:th_an-- agiilnse-thefower-;,;.--~ 
·--~------~- --'.._,-_ ___:_..;;.,-..._...,.....__~ ..... / '·--------. ·-----... t .... ___ ··""';:"-~---. .---..._..,........____ _ ------ ---~ 
probability, high-loss hazards. This result runs contrary to economic 
theory which asserts that insurance should be purchased to protect 
oneself against losses too great to bear and should ·not be purchased 
-- against relatively small losses that can be paid out of pocket should 
they occur. However, the behavior in our experiment makes a certain 
intuitive s.ense. People prefer to protect themselves against hazards 
that are relatively likely to happen. There are only so many things in 
life one can worry about. If people did not ignore low-probability threats, 
they would spend their entire lives obsessively protecting themselves 
against a "Pandora's Box" of rare horrors. The popularity of low deductible 
insurance plans (Fuchs, 1977; Pashigian, Schkade & Menefee, 1966; Schoe-
maker, 1977) and appliance service contracts provides confirmation outside 
the laboratory of the preference for insuring against high-probability 
events with lesser consequences. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
~ . 
.I 
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/ .5 
Seat belts. . - r· - -----.,..,-...,,__ --Another form of insurance that people ~o -noC~often use"') 
-------------
------------ -- --- -
is the automobile seat belt. ';- .Proiitoti~al efforts · · 
.__ ----- - - ---
to get motorists to wear seat belts have failed dismally (Robertson, 
1976). In the wake of expensive advertising campaigns and buzzer systems, 
fewer than 30% of all motorists "buckle up for safety." 
Perhaps the insurance studies can provide some insight into this 
----~ --- --- ;:--::. 
problem. We have calculated that only about 1 in every-()·..?. million 
automobile trips ends with a fatal accident. Wlth the odds so strongly 
against an accident on any single trip, it should not be surprising 
that drivers do not take the trouble to buckle their seat belts. We 
speculate (see Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, 1977a) that repeated 
benign experience leads eventually to a.habit of neglecting the belts, 
for much the same reasons (~i::-- subjects in our insurance studies failed 
to protect themselves against rare hazards. 
The extremely low probability of an accident on a single trip makes 
it unlikely that more than a few individuals will ever use seat belts 
voluntarily. However, one device that succeeded in inducing insurance 
against the rarest hazards in our insurance experiments may also work for 
seat belts. If .we can get people to change their perspective from that 
of a single trip and to consider the risk of serious accident aggregated 
over a longer time period--say a lifetime of driving--the accident 
probabilities then may be high enough to induce a general policy of always 
buckling up. 
Perceived Frequency of Lethal Events 
The next topic is concerned with perceived risk.and, in particular, 
a special type of phenomenon called "availability bias" that tends to 
distort p_g_qp_~-.P_eJ.cep_~_,,ions. 
;.........--------....r.. ."" ,.,..- -·----~- -------- - -·---- ,.... ..... --
...... -· --
.. ____ -- .... --
. ----- - ----- - - --· ______ ....... __ . ______ -----· -- - ........ ____ :;;- .... -' 
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When we make a judgment about the probability or frequency of 
some event, we often base our judgment on the ease with which we can 
imagine that event happening or on the ease with which we can recall 
past instances of that event (Tverksy & Kahneman, 1974}. 
In general, use of availability cues (memorability, imaginability) 
is a good mental strategy. Instances of frequent events are JlSually 
more easily recalled than instances of infrequent events, and likely 
occurrences are easier to imagine than unlikely ones. Thus, availability 
is often an appropriate cue for judging frequency and probability. 
Unfortunately, availability is also affected-by factors unrelated to 
likelihood, such as recency, vividness, and emotional salience. Reliance 
on availability may lead to overestimating the probability of events 
which are unusually memorable or imaginable. 
Availability helps explain many distortions inpJ;rop:re:§_pe,fc~~to~s of 
risk. Consider fears about grizzly bear attacks in(t:[~ national parks. 
Although many people are concerned about the dangerousness of grizzlies, 
the rate of injury is only 1 per 2 million visitors and the rate of 
death is even lower (Herrero, 1970). Sensational media reports contribute 
to the imaginability of death at the claws of an enraged grizzly but the 
media ignore the multitude of favorable public experiences. The motion 
picture, "Jaws," has done a similar service for the availability (and 
perceived likelihood) of shark attacks. Some nuclear power proponents 
feel tihat the risks of that technology are exaggerated in the public's 
,,-:~"' -~ . 
eye because of biased_ .. '. media coverage and association with the vivid, 
I.'..... • 
imaginable, memorable dangers of nuclear war·;;. As Zebroski (1976) notes, 
"fear sells;" the media dwell on potential catastrophes, not on the 
successful day-to-day operations of a power plant. 
-----------.~ 
~ -· 
- - ---- ~ ... -- -=-- --
Availability bias is illustrated in a recent investigation of how 
people perceive low-probability, high-consequence events (Lichtenstein, 
Slovic, Fischhoff, Layman & Combs, 1978). The events were 41 causes 
7 
of death, including diseases, accidents, homicide, suicide, and natural 
hazards (see Table 2). A large group of college::students and members of 
the local League of Women Voters were asked to judge the frequencies of 
these events. In one study, theywere given pairs of events and asked, 
"Which of these two events is a more·frequent cause of death and how many 
times more frequent is it?" In another study, they were told a frequency 
for one item (e.g., electrocution= 1000 deaths a year) and asked to 
estimate frequencies for_the other 40 causes accordingly. The results 
indicated serious misjudgments of frequency for many of the causes of 
death as shown in Table 3 for the paired comparison study and Figure 2 for 
the estimation stud,y. · Of special interest in Table 3 is the overestimation 
of homicide relative to suicide (Pait 4) and the overestimation of 
accident frequencies (Pairs, 7, 10, 13). Thus we see, for example, that 
although diseases take 15.5 times as many lives as accidents, .(P-air 13), only 57% 
-.....:. - - --~ 
of these subjects accurately indicated the more frequent cause and the 
mean ratio was only 1.62. Table 4 lists the lethal events .most over-
estimated and underestimated in our various studies. Overestimated 
items tended to be dramatic, sensational events which,'.receive _:heav:y,;.med_ia 
::,:5 
coverage. Unspectacular events that take one victim at a time and are 
common in non-fatal form (e.g., asthma, emphysema, diabetes) tended to be 
underestimated. A later study showed that these biases in perception 
could be predicted moderately well both from the amount of coverage 
devoted to each cause in the local newspaper and from people's personal 
experiences with these causes. 
----·----
·. ". 8 
----·-----~------------------------------------
Insert Figure 2 and Tables 2, 3 and 4 about here 
This study indicates that we cannot assume that intelligent citizens 
have valid perceptions about the frequency of hazardous events to which 
they are exposed. To the extent that appropriate societal response to 
hazards depends upon the veridicality of citizens'· perceptions of these 
hazards, the present study points to a need for improved public education. 
Fault-tr·ee biases. There are many hazards so new and so rare that 
,£1\~f~]}A_ ~eJ~·~i:~~1~~~3~ 3 .~~0.?-~@maf(J:f!~S risks. 
For these hazards, we often resort .to fault-trees, such as the one in 
Figure 3, as tools for estimating failure probabilities. A fault tree 
. ,1£st·s::;~th;;~od_isai(e_r! --Figure· 3- slio~ws -th~t~;disasr"ro.us·i., · 
-~-·~--- -____ ,. --- ---~- ___ .,._ ·--·----=. - ___ ,,,, ___ ----- ------... - ,_ 
release of radiation from a salt storage repository can occur in three 
different ways (meteorite or weapon impact, groundwater transportation, 
or volcanic activity) one of which, groundwater transportation, can occur 
via six different pathways. 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
When fauit trees are.used to communicate hazard potential, availa-
bility bias, stemming from the effects of memorability and imaginability 
on perceptions of risk, may pose a barrier to open, objective discussions 
of safety.· Imagine an engineer explaining the basis for the estimated 
safety of waste disposal in.a salt mine by outlining the fault tree upon 
which the estimate was based. Rather than reassuring the audience, 
the presentation might have the.opposite effect ("I didn't realize there 
were that many things that could go wrong"). Perhaps the very discussion 
of any low-probability hazard will increase the perceived probability of 
that hazard regardless of what the evidence indicates. As one frustrated 
nuclear proponent lamented, "When laymen discuss what might happen, they 
9 
sometimes don't even bother to include the 'might"' (B. Cohen, 1974, p. 36). 
If public debates and communications from experts do·; little to .,allay fears 
and indeed, exacerbate them, how can we insure democratic freedoms and 
meaningful.public participation in decisions involving rare but extreme 
threats? 
Even for more common, less extreme hazards, perceptions may be biased 
by aspects of fault-tree presentation. A study by Fischhoff, Slavic and 
Lichtenstein (1977) found that people are sometimes quite insensitive 
to how much has been left out of a fault tree. Using a fault tree to 
describe the determinants of starting failures in an automobile, Fischhoff ( -\.~ 
I 
et al found that, deleting branches responsible for about(50%~, of all failures 
only produced a f \7% increase in people's estimate of how ~~h was missing. 
u 
Experienced mechanics were about as insensitive as non-experts. Apparently, 
what was out of sight was also out of mind.' The fault tree presenter who, 
deliberately or inadvertently, fails to mention.a branch may remove it 
completely from consideration. This study also found that the perceived 
importance of a set of problem pathways could be substantially increased 
by presenting it as two (smaller) problem branches rather than as one 
branch (e.g., splitting "fuel system problems" into "fuel problems" and 
"carburetion problems" when describing automobile starting failures). 
The fact that subtle differences in how risks are presented can 
have big effects on how they are perceived suggests that people who 
present risks to the public have considerable ability to manipulate per-
ceptions. Indeed, since these effects are not widely known, people may 
inadvertently be manipulating their own perceptions by\'casual. 'decisions 
/ / 
.,,_, __ _ 
/ ; ' 
they make ~bo;Uhow, 
'..,. ·, .. .;,# h' \ .. ,. I'·"·-. 
., _..,. --------
'organize:thefr''ktlowl~iige. 
""-" ___ . __ . ~~ :-~ , - ..... , .. .,: .::""tr -- · 
How Safe Is Safe Enough? 
---------~----·---, ------- b.:: 
Determining the acceptability of risks in society is a particularly 
important and difficult problem. When "weighing 'the benefits against the 
risks" of technology, the ultimate question policy makers must answer 
is: "Is this technology acceptably safe?" Or, alternatively, "How safe 
is safe enough?" 
We need to develop a model of risk acceptance that would be useful 
to systems designers and policy makers. Such a model whould not dictate 
what risks society should accept, but instead, should reflect the public's 
considered values and preferences. 
There are several basic ways to determine.the social values that 
should comprise a model of acceptable risk. Two methods discussed Below 
are based on what are known as revealed and expressed preferences. 
Revealed preferences. The revealed preference method advocated 
by Chauncey Starr (1969) assumes that, by trial and error, society 
has arrived at a nearly optimal balance between the risks and benefits 
associated with any .activity. Therefore, one may use economic data 
to reveal patterns of acceptable risk-benefit tradeoffs. Acceptable 
risk for a new technology would be the levei of safety associated with 
ongoing activities having similar benefit to society. Starr derived what 
may be regarded as "laws of acceptable risk" from this approach. These 
included (1) the acceptability of risk is proportional to the magnitude 
of the benefits derived from the activity in question, and (2) the public 
is willing to accept much greater risks from voluntary activities (e.g., 
11 
skiing) than it would tolerate from involuntary activities (e.g., food 
preservatives) that provide the same level of benefit. Thus we see that Starr's 
model has two basic components, benefit and voluntariness, as schematized in 
Figure 4a. Insert Figure 4 about here 
' __ .,.,. ________________ , ________ . --.... ~ ... ------------------~, 
The method of revealed preferences is attractive because it is 
grounded in the possible (i.e., in reality); it apparently reflects 
stable relationships; and it incorporates in some way the impacts of 
a wide range of economic factors (not just those known by the participant 
in an expressed preference survey). However, it has. several drawbacks: 
·).!}_-a·worlcf~wher~ vaJU:~ ~;y change quite r;~idly ~.:.. it. ~ssumes, th.~t past. behaV'ior 
.~---·· ;.,.:v-- -::~~·- - -1:.-.--:.::-_~-.~:,~· ,~:;:.·..:-1--...:-- .... ,..;;:.::::··7·).,_ ., _____ .,,_~..:,:";";~~:::.:..:.:;..:_;_-=~-"'p 
·. is a valid ,indicator of present preferences; politically, it is quite ..__,· 
r '._-::.: ._,.~. ,~_,.. - -
conservative in that it enshrines current economic and social arrangements; 
it assumes that what has been traditionally acceptable is also best for 
society; it makes strong (and not always supported) assumptions about the 
rationality of people's decision making; it may be unresponsive to parti-
cular kinds of risks, like those .with a long lead time (e·;g., most carcino-
gens) with regard to which the market responds sluggishly; finally, it is 
far from trivial to develop the measures of risks and benefits that are 
needed for its implementation (Otway & Cohen, 1975). 
Expressed preferences., The most straightforward method for determining 
what people find acceptable is to as:k them to express their preferences. 
directly. The appeal of the expressed preference method is obvious. It 
elicits current preferences, thus b~ing responsive to changing values. 
It also allows for widespread citizen involvement in decision making and 
thus should be politically acceptable. It has, however, some possible 
drawbacks which seem to have greatly restricted its use. Among them are: 
people may not really know what they want; their attitudes and behavior 
may be inconsistent,.different ways of phrasing the same question may 
elicit different preferences; values.may change so rapidly as to make 
systematic planning impossible; people may not understand how their 
12 
preferences will translate into pplicy; and people may want things that 
are unobtainable in reality. 
! 
' 
' 
Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read & Combs (in press) have 
recently used the method of expressed preferences to replicate and extend 
Starr's work. In one study, people were asked to rate the risks and 
benefits accruing to society from each of thirty activities and technologies, 
The results indicated that people believed that more beneficial activities 
should have higher risk levels, and that a double standard existed for 
voluntariness, as in Figure 4a. That is,acceptable risk levels were 
higher for voluntary activities than for involuntary activities providing 
the same level of benefit, a result congruent with that Starr observed. 
However, other characteristics of risk, such as the degree to which the 
risk seems controllable, familiar, known and immediate, a:lso were found to 
induce double standards, as schematized in Figures 4b~l£e,.:-.~
0
l~ditionaL __ ~ 
results indicated that the degree to which an acitivity's risk was 
potentially catastrophic, dread, and likely to be fatal (given a mishap) 
also influenced acceptability. Thus, this study implies that a method 
of determit1ing acceptable risk may need to give weight to all of these 
various characteristics. Consideration of these characteristics made 
acceptability of a risk highly predictable. Conceivably, policy makers 
might be able to use such information to predict public acceptance of the 
risk levels associated with proposed technologies. 
13 
Summary, and Conclusions 
This review has summarized recent psychological research on the 
topic of perceived and acceptable risk. Such research demonstrates 
that management of hazards needs to be based on an understanding of the 
ways in which people think about risk and uncertainty. Without such 
understanding, well~intended plans may not achieve their goals. Although 
research on the perception and evaluation of hazards has been rather 
neglected, there does exist a core of knowledge relevant to problems of 
·safety. 
One important finding comes from rese<;1.rch on insurance behavior, 
which shows that people prefer to insure themselves against relatively 
high-p?obability hazards, rather than the rare, serious threats for 
,, 
which the mechanism of insurance was designed. This research hints that 
probability of loss or damage may.be the dominant stimulus to protective 
action, a hypothesis that needs to.be studied further. One implication 
of this hypothesis, regarding the non-use of seat belts, was discussed 
here. 
A second stream of research described above demonstrates that, 
because of the way the mind works when people are asked to judge 
frequencies or probabilities, perceived risk tends to be distorted by 
imaginability and memorability of the hazard. Additional research not 
described here documents startling degrees of overconfidence, hindstght 
biases, and other intellectual quirks that could have important 
implications for safety. Research on the broad spectrum of difficulties 
people experience when thinking about risk is summarized by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974) and Slovic, Fischhoff ani:llI:.ichtenstein (1977). 
The third project reviewed above demonstrated that it was possible 
t: 
14 
to ask people for complex judgments about their attitudes towards 
risks and receive orderly, interpretable responses,thattprovided insight 
into the question "How safe is safe enough?" In general, people 
expressed a willingness to tolerate greater risks from activities that 
provide greater benefits. However, the -level of acceptable risk was 
influenced strongly by other characteristics of the activity, such as 
the degree to which its risks are voluntary, controllable, understood, 
familiar, dread, catastrophic, etc. Research currently in progress is 
attempting to expand these results into a quantitative model of risk 
acceptability that could enable systems designers and policy makers to 
be more responsive to people's preferences. 
/ I 
I, 
(is, 
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Table 1 
Farm Game Hazards 
Hazard No. Probability Loss Premium 
1 .002 $247,500 $500 
2 . 01 49,500 500 
3 . 05 9,900 500 
4 .10 4,950 500 
5 .25 1,980 500 
Source: Slovic et al, 1977. 
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Table 2 
. . 
--------·------- . . . --d -~---~.;.l....-..- -·~-~__..__, ---... 
Causes of Death and their Statistical.-Ffequencies 
_ ___________ p~f 108 U.S. Residents per Year \ \ 
·---~. --- ----· - ·~- -~~ . . · ... ----·--. -----------.-------.. ---~---·-- ----· 
·· ... -~----. -------J· 
--:--------------~--------,--------------
Smallpox )' 
Poisoning by vitamins 
Botulism 
Measles 
· Fireworks 
Smallpox vaccination. 
Whooping cough 
Polio 
Venomous bite or sting 
Tornado 
Lightning 
Non-venomous animal 
Flood 
Excess cold 
·syphilis 
Pregnancy, childbirth, 
and abortion 
Infectious hepatitis 
Appendicitis 
Electrocution 
·\ Motor vehicle-train 
coll;i.sion 
) 
Asthma 
Rate/108 
0 
''\ 
f 5 
.. ·. 
,· 
1-
2.4 
3 
·.4 
7.2 
. 8.3 
23.5 
44 
52 
63 
100 
· 163 
200 
220 
330 
440 
500 
740 
920 
Firearm!accident 
Poisoning by solid 
or lic,.uid 
Tuberculosis 
. . ' 
Fire & . flames 
I 
Drowning 
Leukemia 
Accidental falls 
HomicidJ 
· _ Emphysel\la · 
Suicide: 
· Rate/108 
, 1,100 
.·1,2so 
1,800 
,---: 
3,.600 
3,.600 
7,100 
8,500 
9,200 
10,600 
Breast cancer 
Diabete~ 
I 
12,000: 
..!~i . ... 
. 15,200 .,i :• 
19,.000!_ 
Motor v~hicle (car, 
truck :or bus)accident 27,000 
Lung caricer 37,000 
., I 
Cancer of the digestive 
system · ~ .,,_ 46,.600 . 
I 
All accidents . 55,000 
i 
Stroke : 
All can1er 
Heart disease 
All diseases 
' 
'. 
I 
I 
:,, 102~000 
· 160,000 
. 360,000 
849,000 
·:.1· 
;, -- I (-
1 
.. S~urce: National Center: for. Health S_t_at_~stiC:s and Lichtenstein et al, 1978. · 
. '"'\.,,---. ·--- .. -- :- -- -···· ."" . . . ----c-··-·----= .-
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Table 3 
I 
l 
i 
I 
I 
.,C 
..Tttdgments of Relative Frequency1 for Selectied Pairs.of Lethal Events 
Geometric 
True :% Correct · Mean of: 
Less Likely More Likely Ratio :niscrimina tion Judged Ratios 
· 1. Asthma ' Firearm Accident . · 1.20 80 11.00 
2. Breast Cancer Diabetes 1.25 23 [7 .69] 
3. Lung Cancer. ·stomach Cancer 1.25 25 [3.23] 
4. Homicide Suicide 1.30 32 [5.26] 
· 5. Leukemia Emphysema 1.49 47 [l. 72] 
· 6. Stroke All Cancer. 1.57 83 21.00 
7. All Accidents Stroke· 1.85 20 ,·, \' i -,. [25.00] ], 
8. Pregnancy Appendicitis ·2.00 17 '[10.00] 
9. Tuberculosis Fire & Flames 2.00 81 · 10.50. 
10. Emphysema ·. All Accidents 5.19 88 
. 269.00 
11. Polio Tornado 5.30 71 4.-26 
,:+,;, 
· 12. Drowning Suicide 9.60 70 ·'! 
' 
5.50 t. 
13.All Accidents . All Diseases 15.50 57 '· 1.62 
14. Diabetes 
. Heart: Disease . ·. 18.90 97 127.00 
15. Tornado Asthma 20.90 . : 42 [2.98).· 
' 
16. Syphilis Homicide 46.00 86 31. 70 · 
17. Botulism 
-Lightning 52.00 37 [3.33] 
18. Flood Homicide 92.00 . I 91 81. 70 . 
19. Syphilis Diabetes 95.00 64 2.36 
20. Botulism Asthma 920.00 59 1.50 
21. Excess Cold All · Cane.er· 982.00 95 1490.00 
· 22. Botulism Emphysema 10,600.00 86 24.00 
a 
· aGeometric means in brackets indicate that th;e mean ratio was higher for the 
le.ss likely event. A geometric mean of [5.00] . implies the mean was 5:1 in 
the wrong direc;ion. 
_.----~- "'·---·- :,---'- .. ~-· ~- ' -
Source: Lichtenstein et al, 1978. 
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· Table 4 
-~---: . · ...... ,-;··-~--" .. ~ 
-. ·,-. ... --.. ' -,.---- BIAS IN PERCE IVEO FREQUENCY 
MOST OVERESTIMATED 
l. ALL ACCIDENTS 
2. MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS 
3. PREGNANCY, CHILDBIRTH, .ABORTION 
.. 4. TORNADO 
· 5. FLOOD 
6. BOTULISM 
. 7. ·. ALL CANCER 
8. FIRE AND FLAMES 
·9. VENOMOUS BITE OR STING 
. 10. HOMICIDE 
. MOST UN DE REST I MATED .· 
l. ; SMALLPOX VACCINATION 
. 2. : DIABETES 
3. i STOMACH CANCER 
: 
. 4. : LIGHTNING 
5. : STROKE. 
6.: TUBERCULOSIS 
7. ! ASTHMA 
8. ·• EMPHYSEMA 
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